U.S. Buries Its No. 1 Bogyman : Latin left is no longer a ‘threat’ --except maybe in Mexico.

In Haiti, ‘the United States is on the side of a coup’s victims, not its authors. This might be a sea change for Latin America.’

Haiti has always been an extreme case, almost a caricature of the vices and virtues of the Latin America/Caribbean region. First to win independence through a popular struggle--and then to have its leader die in a French dungeon; first to abolish slavery--then to have a slave-like system emerge and thrive; a paradigm of U.S. invasion during the first half of this century, and the epitome of dictatorial rule and repression from mid-century onward. So it is not surprising that today’s Haiti-U.S. travails are a microcosm of much broader trends that are developing in Latin America and its relations with the United States.

It used to be, or so it seemed to many Latin Americans, that the United States was in the business of overturning every expression of popular political will: overthrowing or helping to overthrow democratically elected left-of-center governments (Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, Goulart in Brazil in 1964, Allende in Chile in 1973), or exerting military pressure against popular left-of-center regimes (Cuba in 1961, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Nicaragua from 1981 onward, Grenada in 1983). So how is it now that Washington is bearing down on Haiti in an effort to restore a democratically elected left-of-center president to office?

First, of course, the end of the Cold War has changed many things. Among them is the perceived threat to the United States of left-wing rulers. Washington still does not like Haiti’s President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. But he does not represent a danger--real or imaginary--to U.S. national security, and he might actually help in what could become a major problem: the flow of Haitian refugees to Florida.

The other change behind Washington’s stance may be a newly pragmatic effort to help end the cyclical pattern of history in Latin America for at least the past half-century: After periods of authoritarian governance, elections are held, candidates with strong popular (and populist, some could say) ties are elected on platforms promising to redress age-old grievances. As they proceed to fulfill part of their promises, they alienate the Establishment--the military, the business community, the church and Washington. The plotting begins, and a coup restores the authoritarians to power.

This is pretty much what happened in Haiti. After decades of repressive, corrupt rule, elections were held and a charismatic and totally unexperienced president won by a landslide. He then began, very slowly, to implement some of the policies expected by those who elected him. Inevitably, he committed errors and excesses, as reformers often do, but he was overthrown because of what he did right--being responsive to his electorate--not for what he did wrong.

The difference is that this time, the United States is on the side of a coup’s victims, not its authors. This might be a sea change for Latin America; if so, it is a welcome one. But Washington should go forward with its eyes open. If Father Aristide returns to power, no matter how mellowing an experience his ouster and exile may have been, he will face the unending Latin American dilemma: either to accommodate his enemies, who will still have real power no matter how low a profile they choose to take initially; or to stand up to them by governing for the impoverished majority that elected him.

What makes the current imbroglio fascinating from a Latin American perspective is whether the change in U.S. attitude is simply a product of Haiti’s size and proximity, or whether it implies a deeper transformation. Can Washington live with the left in Latin America not only in a tiny, destitute nation but also in countries like Mexico and Brazil?

This is not an academic question. In Brazil, the left-of-center Lula has a 2-1 lead in the polls over his closest rival for the presidency next year. And the formal launching of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas’ second run for the presidency of Mexico got off to a surprisingly powerful start a few days ago, when twice as many people as expected--well over 30,000--showed up for his nominating convention.

Can the United States find common ground with the likes of Lula and Cardenas? Current policy suggests reasons for doubting: In Mexico, the Clinton Administration seems to prefer an authoritarian pro-U.S. regime to a prickly one springing from a truly democratic process. And the obsession with free-market economic reforms has already created some tensions between Lula and Clinton officials.

Harbinger or not, the change in Haiti will make a difference. After all, another island in the stream, almost as small, has had an enormous impact for 35 years. Haiti might undo what Cuba has wrought.